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Report on Madhyamaka Studies at the 17th
Congress of the International Association of
Buddhist Studies in Vienna
Szymon Bogacz
This is a summary report of the presentations on Madhyamka presented dur-
ing the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.
The congress was organised by the International Association of Buddhist
Studies and University of Vienna and held from 18 August to 23 August 2014
in Vienna, Austria. Out of the nearly 400 presentations submitted at the con-
gress, a selection of presentations related to Indian Madhyamka studies will
be given here. The presentations were spread across three panels and five
sections. The purpose of this report is to provide an outline of their content.
This selection of papers is by no means comprehensive. For instance, I
have omitted numerous excellent presentations regarding the reception of
Madhyamaka in Tibet and China, as well as presentations about late In-
dian Madhyamaka and its associations with Tantric Buddhism. I focused in-
stead on papers presenting the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka, Can-
drakīrti and Jñānagarbha. Moreover, some papers regarding Madhyamaka
were presented in parallel sessions, and thus it was (physically) impossible
for me to attend all of them.
The report begins with a summary of papers offered in three panels:
Buddhist Theories of Causation; Pramāṇa across Asia: India, China, Korea,
Japan; and Riding the Yoked Necks of the Lions of the Middle Way and Epi-
stemology.Then it presents papers from the following sections: Abhidharma
Studies; Buddhist Philosophy of Mind; Epistemology and Logic in Buddhism;
Mahāyāna Buddhism; and Schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The order of the
papers presented here resembles the succession of papers given at the con-
gress.The report endswith a short summary of discussed topics and amodest
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observation on the course of Madhyamaka studies nowadays.
In the panel “Buddhist Theories of Causation” SonamThakchoe (Univer-
sity of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia) argued that Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka
accepts the thesis that empty phenomena are causally effective, and that Can-
drakīrti endorsed a non-foundational/non-essential type of causality.The fol-
lowing discussion regarded the nature of Thakchoe’s non-foundational caus-
ality and a general question regarding the ontological commitment of the
Madhyamaka.
In the panel “Pramāṇa across Asia: India, China, Korea, Japan” Shoryu
Katsura (RyukokuUniversity, Kyoto, Japan) presented a structure of the Fang-
bianxinlun (方便心論, T 1632). The text is traditionally attributed to Nāgār-
juna and is currently under the process of translation into English by Katsura
and Bernard Gillion (McGill University, Montreal, Canada). Prof. Katsura fo-
cused on the characteristic of logical proof (prayoga) as presented by author
of Fangbianxinlun and on the role of the text in the development of Indian
logic. The next paper in the panel was delivered by Karen Lang (University
of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA) concerning Candrakīrtiʼs argument against
Mīmāṃsakaʼs opponent in Candrakīrtiʼs commentary on Catuḥśataka 5.23.
As argued, Candrakīrti was aware of the logical standards of the debate elab-
orated by Naiyāyikas and Dignāga, which in turn shows the wider context
of the development of prāsaṅga argumentation.
In another panel “Riding the Yoked Necks of the Lions of the MiddleWay
and Epistemology” Anne MacDonald (Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vi-
enna, Austria) shared the results of her work on Candrakīrtiʼs Prasannapadā
and Catuḥśatakaṭīkā. The conclusion she drew was that the theory of pratya-
kṣa presented by the “logical school” of Dignāga, and generally Dignāgaʼs
notion of a valid argument is, according to Candrakīrti, deeply flawed. It is
also worth mentioning that MacDonald has recently published an extensive
and admirable two-volume translation of the first chapter of Candrakīrtiʼs
Prasannapadā.¹The following paper in the panel was given by Ritsu Akahane
(Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Vienna, Austria)
who asked how we can grasp the conventional truth. As demonstrated by
Akahane, the answer to this question given by Jñānagarbhaʼs in his Satya-
¹Anne MacDonald, In Clear Words The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, Vol. I: Introduction, Ma-
nuscript Description, Sanskrit Text, Vol. II: Annotated Translation, Tibetan Text, Verlag der
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Veinna 2015. Due to the support from the
Austrian Sciences Fund the book is available in Open Access and can be downloaded here
(access 13.04.2015).
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dvayavibhaṅgavṛtti was modelled on the theory of pratyakṣa and anumāṇa
presented in Dharmakīrtiʼs Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti and Pramāṇaviniścaya.
This in consequence shows an influence of Dharmakīrti theories on Jñāna-
garbhaʼs Madhyamaka.
In the section “Abhidharma Studies” Goran Kardas (Faculty of Human-
ities and Social Sciences University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia) commented
on papers by Richard H. Robinson and Richard Hayes.² According to Kar-
das, fragments of *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣaśāstra (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論卷第,
T 1545) support thesis that theAbhidharmikaʼsmeaning of the term svabhāva
was, contrary to Robinson andHayes, the same as its meaning in Nāgārjunaʼs
writings.
In the session “Buddhist Philosophy of Mind”, which drew attention not
only because its relevance to the Madhyamaka studies but also due to its
importance for the Indian philosophy of mind in general,³ Christian Coseru
(College of Charleston, Charleston, USA) argued that Candrakīrtiʼs critique
of svasaṃvedana ignored the phenomenological aspect of consciousness and,
more problematically, cannot solve the so-called binding problem, i.e. how
different mental contents are combined into a single experience. Mark Sid-
erits (Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea) argued against Coseru
and in favour of Nāgārjuna-Candrakīrtiʼs view that consciousness is not self-
aware basing his arguments on findings in cognitive science.
In another session “Epistemology and Logic in Buddhism” I gave a paper
about the possible extension of Graham Priestʼs FDES calculus over svātantra
arguments. As I reasoned, paraconsistent representation of these arguments
is problematic in the face of the fact that according to Bhāviveka there can
be no proof for an incoherent thesis. Moreover, FDES renders formal prob-
lems regarding the representation of prasāṇga reasoning because it cannot
make sense out of typical ad absurdum inference. In the same session, Laura
Guerrero (Utah Valley University, Utah, USA) argued that Madhyamikas and
Yogācārins share the metaphysical global antirealistic assumptions. This in
turn forces them to present an account of conventional truth that is a norm-
ative concept. In the end, Yogācāraʼs antirealism serves this purpose better.
In the session “Mahāyāna Buddhism” Shaoyong Ye (Department of South
²Richard H. Robinson, Did Nagarjuna Really Refuted All Philosophical Views?, “Philosophy
East and West” 1972, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 325–331, Richard P. Hayes, Nāgārjuna’s Appeal,
“Journal of Indian Philosophy” 1994, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 299–378.
³A more detailed report on this session was given by Elisa Freschi on her blog (access
13.04.2015).
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Asian Studies, Peking University, Beijing, Peopleʼs Republic of China) presen-
ted an interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy in which svabhāva is under-
stood as a referent of a concept. Because there is no direct way to prove the
existence of the referents, Nāgārjunaʼs refutation of svabhāva is a refutation
of the mental images of things and not the things themselves.⁴
In the session “Schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism”, last but not least, Jan
Westerhoff (Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom) presented a consist-
ent and appealing nihilistic interpretation of Nāgārjunaʼs Madhyamaka. Ac-
cording to Westerhoff, Madhyamaka nihilism is a combination of eliminativ-
ism, i.e. a thesis that some sort of entities do not exist, and non-foundational-
ism, i.e. a thesis that the (alleged) hierarchy of existence does not possess the
lowest level.⁵
To sumup, the numerous papers regardingMadhyamaka presented at the
17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies aimed at
setting Madhyamikas among their fellow philosophers. Topics such as con-
ventional/ultimate truth and the structure of the Madhyamikasʼ arguments
were most widely discussed. This is also true, although with some differ-
ences, for papers on Tibetan and Chinese Madhyamaka. The participants of
two panels, “Pramāṇa across Asia: India, China, Korea, Japan” and “Riding
the Yoked Necks of the Lions of the Middle Way and Epistemology”, presen-
ted insightful observations about the historical and philosophical relations
between Madhyamaka philosophy and Dignāga/Dharmakīrti epistemology
and logic. Taking a longer view, the Madhyamaka studies tend to be more
about the nature and the form of Madhyamaka arguments than about their
content.
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